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At Debt’s Door: What Can We Learn from 
Argentina’s Recent Debt Crisis and 
Restructuring? 
Alan Cibils & Rubén Lo Vuolo1 
 
Argentina’s spectacular December 2001 economic crash and default were 
the culmination of a debt-led development process that began in the late 
1970s.  Much has been written about the crisis and its causes, and many 
interpretations have been put forth as to why it occurred.  Despite 
overwhelming empirical evidence to the contrary, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the financial establishment still claim that the 
root cause of Argentina’s crisis was the public sector’s inability to reduce 
its deficit.2  Other explanations have included the more esoteric “debt 
intolerance” concept, or that the default itself was the cause of Argentina’s 
2002 economic collapse.3  
 This paper argues that none of these explanations hold up under scrutiny.  
Rather, the December 2001 default and economic crisis were the logical 
outcome of a massive debt accumulation process which resulted from two 
main factors. First, the negative effects of policy prescriptions by the 
international financial institutions (IFIs), particularly the IMF and the 
World Bank (WB), enthusiastically implemented by Argentine officials. In 
other words, US-trained Argentine officials and IFI staff acted like a team 
in which there was a high degree of agreement on the economic policies to 
be implemented.  Second, a series of exogenous shocks which ranged from 
US interest rate hikes to financial crises in Asia, Russia, and, finally, Brazil. 
These shocks led to spiraling costs of public sector borrowing and to 
massive capital flight as the system unraveled.  
The combination of inconsistent macroeconomic policies and exogenous 
shocks led to an economic collapse of historical proportions in December 
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2001.4  While the Argentine fixed exchange rate regime had managed to 
survive the Mexican and Asian financial crises, the Brazilian crisis proved 
too much for an economy straining under the effects of an overvalued 
currency.  A recession set in during the last quarter of 1998 and that 
recession was to become a depression.  By the end of the depression in the 
second quarter of 2002, Argentina had lost almost 20 percent of its GDP.5 
Under these conditions, and as a result of the exponential growth of 
Argentina’s public debt, this paper argues that sovereign default was not 
only a logical consequence, it was also a necessity.  Given the three-year-
long economic recession, economic reactivation would have been uncertain, 
and perhaps impossible, in the absence of such a default.  Also fundamental 
to economic recovery was the abandonment of the fixed exchange rate 
regime; the result allowed for a more realistic set of relative prices.6   
Section I of this paper will provide a description of the main reasons 
behind Argentina’s debt accumulation for the 1990–2001 period.  Section II 
will evaluate the central role played by the IMF both before and after the 
2001–2002 crisis.  Section III will briefly discuss issues surrounding the 
actual costs of Argentina’s sovereign default.  Section IV will address the 
main issues surrounding Argentina’s debt-restructuring process.  This paper 
will then conclude with a list of lessons that can be drawn from Argentina’s 
experience with debt, default, and the IMF. 
I.   THE 1990S: ORTHODOX REFORMS AND EXPLOSIVE GROWTH OF 
PUBLIC DEBT IN ARGENTINA 
The origins of Argentina’s debt troubles can be traced back to the 1976 
military dictatorship.  When the military took power, Argentina’s public 
debt totaled approximately $8 billion.7  By the time the military left seven 
years later, the public debt had more than quintupled to $45 billion.8  
However, the latest chapter in Argentina’s debt-accumulation saga began in 
1989, when Carlos Menem was elected president in the midst of substantial 
social unrest and economic instability brought on by very high inflation 
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rates. Menem had campaigned on a traditional populist discourse, promising 
higher wages and a “productive revolution.”  Campaign discourse 
notwithstanding, as soon as Menem took office it became clear that his 
policies would be diametrically opposed to those he had promised just 
weeks earlier.  During 1989 and 1990, two different economy ministers 
made unsuccessful attempts to reduce high inflation and economic 
turbulence.9  These attempts included a series of orthodox fiscal and 
monetary policy measures, such as a freely floating exchange rate, a radical 
reduction of fiscal spending, and the first privatization of state enterprises.   
Additionally, debt-service payments on Argentina’s public debt, which had 
been in a virtual state of default since 1988, were resumed.10 
Partly as a result of these policies, there was another hyperinflationary 
episode toward the end of 1990.11  Consequently, in early 1991 Menem 
appointed Domingo Cavallo, a Harvard-trained economist, as economy 
minister.  Cavallo promptly implemented a radical, Washington 
Consensus12 (WC)-inspired stabilization and economic restructuring 
program known as the Convertibility Plan.  The main components of this 
plan were the following: (1) trade liberalization; (2) financial and capital 
account liberalization, including equal treatment for foreign and domestic 
capital; (3) privatization of all state-owned enterprises; (4) prohibition 
against printing money unless backed by dollars in the Central Bank’s 
reserves; and (5) pegging of the peso to the dollar by law, on a one-to-one 
exchange rate. 
The Convertibility Plan’s primary stated objective was to reign in 
inflation and to provide a strong anchor for expectation formation.13  
However, the plan’s unstated objectives went much further.  Over the next 
decade the plan would produce a profound transformation on the Argentine 
economy and society that would definitively dismantle what was left of the 
Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) era Welfare State.  In other 
words, state enterprises, utilities, and social security were all to be 
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privatized, state intervention in the economy was to be drastically reduced, 
and health and education were to be decentralized. 
The success of the Convertibility Plan hinged upon attracting foreign 
capital inflows.  The hope was that foreign capital flows would set off a 
“virtuous cycle” of economic growth and general welfare improvements for 
the population (through “trickle down” effects), which would then lead to 
further investment flows and so on.14  Solving the public debt problem was 
seen as key to attracting foreign capital.15 Therefore, a “once-and-for-all 
solution” to the debt problem was devised.  Official faith in this strategy 
was such that Minister Cavallo stated in 1993 that “the public debt will be 
insignificant by the end of the century.”16 
The “once-and-for-all solution” consisted of two main parts.  The first 
component of the solution to the debt problem consisted of allowing 
privatization of state enterprises to be purchased partly with Argentine 
public debt bonds.17  This was the case for the national telephone company, 
Entel, and the national airline, Aerolíneas Argentinas.18  This operation 
greatly favored holders of Argentine debt, since they were given full credit 
for bonds that were trading at 15–20 percent of their nominal value on the 
open market.19 
The second component of the solution to Argentina’s debt problem came 
with the Brady Agreement, signed in December of 1992.  According to this 
agreement, Argentina would swap its $21 billion debt to commercial banks, 
plus $8.3 billion in late payments, for 30-year Brady bonds with lower 
interest rates and an average capital reduction of 35 percent.20  The main 
result of this swap, illustrated in Table 1 below, was the atomization of 
Argentina’s creditors from a few Northern commercial banks to hundreds of 
thousands or millions of bondholders around the world. 
 How permanent was this solution to Argentina’s debt problem?  The data 
in Table 1 shows that Argentina’s public debt continued to grow at an 
alarming rate throughout the 1990s, reaching explosive levels toward the 
end of the decade when the much publicized default occurred.21  Perhaps 
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the main result of the Brady bond swap was that Argentina was able to 
regain access to financial markets.22  Renewed access to these markets 
enabled the debt accumulation process that eventually resulted in the largest 
sovereign default in history. 
What were the reasons behind this explosive debt accumulation?  Perhaps 
the most widespread explanation given for Argentina’s December 2001 debt 
crisis is that the country was unable to reign in its runaway fiscal spending 
and therefore needed to borrow increasingly large sums to both finance its 
deficit (since, by law, Argentina was unable to finance itself by printing 
money) and to service its rapidly accumulating debt. For example, 
according to Anoop Singh, the IMF’s former Western Hemisphere Director, 
“failures in fiscal policy constitute the root cause of the . . . crisis.”23  This 
view continues to be voiced by high ranking IMF officials and is mentioned 
repeatedly in the IMF’s Independent Evaluation Office report on the IMF’s 
role in the Argentine crisis.24  Many orthodox economists, in Argentina and 
abroad, and much of the business media support this view as well. 
When examined against actual data, however, the contention that 
Argentina’s spiraling debt was caused by runaway fiscal spending or debt 
intolerance becomes untenable.  Based on available data, three main causes 
emerge for Argentina’s 1990s debt buildup.  First was the growth in debt 
service due to external shocks.  Second was the privatization of social 
security.  Third was the growth of private sector demand for foreign  
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exchange, created by the very nature of the previously discussed economic 
restructuring program known as the Convertibility Plan.   
A. Growth in Debt Service Due to External Shocks 
It is difficult to find evidence that the government’s fiscal policy played a 
significant role in bringing about the December 2001 debt crisis.  Table 2, 
seen below, shows the central government’s revenue, spending, interest 
payments, and primary and overall budget deficit or surplus from 1993–
2001.  Although the government budget does move from a surplus of 2.7 
billion pesos in 1993 (1.2 percent of GDP) to a peak deficit of 8.7 billion 
pesos by 2001 (3.2 percent of GDP), this worsening of the fiscal balance is 
not a result of increases in government spending.  
Rather, the worsening of the fiscal balance can be explained by the 
country being hit with a series of exogenous interest-rate shocks that caused 
a debt spiral and, eventually, a default.25  The shocks that hit Argentina can 
be seen from the data on the government’s primary balance26 in Table 2, 
below.  The primary balance moves from a surplus of 5.6 billion pesos (2.4 
percent of GDP) in 1993 to a surplus of 1.5 billion (0.5 percent of GDP) in 
2001.  But this worsening of the primary balance was not a result of 
government decisions to increase spending.  Primary spending was 19.1 
percent of GDP in 1993, and 18.6 percent for 2001.  Rather, Argentina 
became stuck in a debt spiral in which higher interest rates increased the 
debt and the country’s risk premium.  Argentina’s unrestricted capital 
mobility and currency board system—a deadly combination—made it 
impossible for the country to withstand the external shocks.  A recession 
that would become a depression began in late 1998, substantially eroding 
economic activity and fiscal revenues.  The government’s response, 
following IMF prescriptions, was to implement increasingly orthodox 
economic policies, which only deepened the recession.  This combination  
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of policies and events led to ever-higher interest rates and debt-service 
payments until default became all but inevitable in December of 2001. 
Some economists have argued that the economy could have adjusted to 
and recovered from the external shocks,  if only wages had fallen enough:  
If Argentina had a more flexible economic system, especially in its 
labor markets, its economy would have been more able to adapt to 
the rigors of the Convertibility Plan; unemployment would have 
been lower; growth would have been stronger; fiscal deficits would 
have been smaller; and interest rates would have been lower because 
creditors would have had more confidence in the capacity of the 
Argentine government to service its obligations.27 
Any macroeconomic policy regime that requires such a fall in nominal 
wages is, as a practical matter, untenable.  Theoretical and political issues 
aside, suggesting a drop in wages as the solution to the Argentine recession 
shows a profound lack of knowledge of the workings of the Argentine labor 
market.  Regardless of what the labor legislation says, in reality, virtually 
half of all employment is informal, with no benefits and substantially lower 
wages than the formal sector.28  In other words, the Argentine labor market 
has had a high degree of flexibility for almost a decade, rendering the 
argument of lower wages irrelevant. 
Considering the array of problematic policies already in place, it is also 
difficult to imagine any fiscal policy—assuming it were even politically 
possible to cut enormous amounts of government spending—that could 
have avoided the December 2001 crisis.  The overvalued currency, the size 
and growth of Argentina’s debt (mostly denominated in foreign currency) 
relative to export earnings, and the free mobility of capital all contributed to 
the inevitable crisis that materialized in 2001. 
B.  Privatization of Social Security 
Another main cause for Argentina’s 1990s debt buildup is the Argentine 
government’s decision in 1994 to privatize the public pay-as-you-go social 
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security system that had been in existence since 1967.29  This decision was 
strongly promoted and supported by the World Bank and the IMF and had a 
major impact on Argentina’s fiscal accounts.30  As Table 3 shows,  the lost 
revenue, plus accumulated interest costs, amounted to nearly the entire 
government budget deficit in 2001.31 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Lost Soc. Sec. Rev. -0.5% -1.0% -1.0% -1.0% -1.0% -1.0% -1.0% -1.0%
Interest Rate 10% 10% 10% 10% 14% 14% 20% 20%
Interest Costs -0.01% -0.10% -0.20% -0.30% -0.60% -0.86% -1.59% -2.16%
Additional Deficit -0.51% -1.10% -1.20% -1.30% -1.59% -1.86% -2.59% -3.16%
Cumulative Debt -0.51% -1.62% -2.72% -3.83% -5.35% -7.50% -10.05% -13.49%
Source: Baker and Weisbrot
Table 3: The Fiscal Impact of Social Security Privatization (percent of GDP)
 
The reason social security privatization had such a substantial impact on 
government accounts is really quite simple and should have been easily 
predicted.  The government lost most of the social security contribution 
revenues, which, following privatization, were funneled to the private 
pension funds.  However, the government’s expenditures on social security 
remained the same, as all of the retirees on the pay-as-you-go system 
continued to collect their pensions from the government.  In this way, a 
substantial gap was created which, according to the data in Table 3, 
amounted to 1 percent of GDP each year between 1995 and 2001.  
Due to restrictions on deficit financing imposed by the Convertibility 
Plan, the government’s options were to either increase revenues, radically 
lower expenditures, or borrow to cover the gap.  The government resorted 
mainly to borrowing, which contributed to the debt spiral.32  This increased 
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borrowing, coupled with the external shocks described earlier, produced an 
explosive debt accumulation process that collapsed in December 2001.33 
C.  The Balance of Payments: Demand for Foreign Exchange 
A third cause for Argentina’s debt buildup can be found in the very 
nature of the convertibility regime itself, which created a growing demand 
for foreign exchange from both the public and private sectors.  The public 
sector demand for foreign exchange was based on two needs: (1) the need to 
keep Central Bank reserves equivalent to pesos in circulation (as per the 
Convertibility Law), and (2) the need to make debt-service payments that 
were primarily in foreign exchange.34  Private sector demand for foreign 
exchange resulted from a need to finance imports, which, given the 
overvalued peso, resulted in a growing trade imbalance.  This was only 
reversed during the recessionary periods.35  The private sector also showed 
a growing preference for the dollar over the peso, as witnessed by 
increasing dollar-denominated bank deposits and the dollarization of many 
economic transactions.36 
As a result, throughout the 1990s, both the private and public sector had 
negative current account balances.  The only way to ensure a current 
account surplus was through sustained capital account surpluses.  While 
foreign direct investment partially satisfied this need, overall it proved 
insufficient to meet the demand for foreign exchange.37  As a result, the 
foreign exchange gap was covered with both public and private debt.  
Starting in the mid 1990s, increasing capital flight worsened this 
situation, resulting in a growing private current account deficit, as shown in 
Table 4.  According to several authors,38 the private foreign exchange 
deficit was covered with public sector reserve accumulation, due primarily 
to new debt issues.  As a result, private behavior (particularly that of large 
business conglomerates) worked against the survival of the convertibility 
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1992-94 1995-99 2000-01 Total '92-'01
CURRENT ACCOUNT -8.908 -10.654 -6.854 -9.370
  Private Sector -6.650 -6.818 -1.448 -5.694
    Trade Balance -2.633 -380 5.033 27
    Financial Services -913 -2.515 -2.411 -2.013
    Real and Other Services -3.104 -3.924 -4.070 -3.707
  Public Sector -2.258 -3.836 -5.406 -3.677
    Financial Services -2.141 -3.728 -5.322 -3.571
    Real and Other Services -117 -108 -84 -106
CAPITAL ACCOUNT 11.842 13.711 2.761 10.960
  Private Sector 8.595 4.902 -5.309 3.968
    Foreign Direct Investment 4.783 10.602 7.428 8.221
    Portfolio and Other Investment 4.097 -548 -5.814 -208
    Capital Flight -3.772 -9.935 -6.170 -7.333
    Foreign Debt 3.487 4.783 -753 3.287
  Public Sector 3.247 8.809 8.071 6.993
    Foreign Debt 3.247 8.809 8.071 6.993
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 2.934 3.056 -4.093 1.590
  Private Sector 1.945 -1.916 -6.758 -1.726
  Public Sector 989 4.973 2.665 3.316
Source: Kulfas and Schorr (2003)
Table 4: Disaggregated Balance of Payments Data (1992—2001) 
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regime, which subsisted as long as it did thanks to continued public 
indebtedness.39 
In sum, a combination of exogenous shocks, privatization of the social 
security system, and capital flight were the main factors responsible for the 
debt buildup of the 1990s.  These problems were compounded by both the 
economic recession that began in the third quarter of 1998, which later 
became a full-fledged depression, and the recessionary fiscal policies that 
the government implemented at the behest of the IMF.   
D.  Debt Intolerance? 
Some have argued recently that Argentina may suffer from “debt 
intolerance,” given that it has “serially defaulted” on its debt throughout its 
almost two hundred-year history.40  According to this argument, the default 
and crisis are due to economic characteristics acquired over two centuries 
and to the government’s irresponsibility in borrowing beyond its level of 
“debt tolerance.”41  Damill has convincingly argued against this view.42  
The country’s remote past is, for all practical purposes, irrelevant to the 
current situation.  It is hard to argue that Argentina’s financial crisis in the 
late 1800s had any direct bearing upon the crisis of 2001.  By placing the 
emphasis on the remote past, proponents of the “debt intolerance” theory 
tend to ignore the very real policy mistakes of the 1990s that had a direct 
bearing on debt accumulation and the subsequent default.  
Be that as it may, it is interesting that financial markets—which actually 
loan the money—completely ignored the notion of debt intolerance in the 
Argentine case, lending far beyond the level that Reinhart has suggested.43  
Furthermore, the IMF itself ignored the notion of debt intolerance in 
Argentina, as witnessed by its almost $10 billion loan to Argentina just 
three months before the economic collapse.44  Given Argentina’s post-
default success with new debt issues, and given that the country’s debt-to-
GDP ratio is currently greater than 80 percent, it would appear that  
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financial markets still do not consider debt intolerance to be a relevant 
concept.45 
II.   THE IMF AND POLICY FORMULATION IN ARGENTINA 
Following the Argentine financial meltdown, the IMF went to 
considerable lengths  to show that Argentine officials were entirely to blame 
for the collapse of the Convertibility Plan.46  However, as will be shown, the 
IMF had substantially participated in Argentina’s macroeconomic policy 
formulation before, during, and after the crisis, and is therefore also 
partially responsible for the economic collapse.  
First, as the IMF’s Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) report clearly 
states, the IMF supported Argentina’s policy reforms during the 1990s, 
including the privatization of social security, which was the main cause of 
the country’s fiscal problems, described earlier.47  IMF support was explicit, 
as privatization was a condition in several of the IMF agreements with 
Argentina during the 1990s.48  Further, the IMF’s invitation to President 
Menem to address the Joint Annual Meetings of the Board of Governors of 
the IMF and the World Bank Group in October 1998 was a clear sign of the 
IMF’s approval and support for the economic policies implemented in 
Argentina during the 1990s.49 
Second, when the depression began in late 1998, the IMF conditioned its 
financial assistance on a series of fiscal spending cuts aimed at reducing the 
fiscal deficit.50  As pointed out above, the deficit was not due to increased 
fiscal spending but to debt-service payments that spiraled out of control as a 
result of exogenous shocks and the privatization of social security.  IMF-
recommended fiscal spending cuts acted procyclically, deepening the crisis 
until the system collapsed.  Spending cuts resulted in a drop in economic 
activity, which, given Argentina’s tax structure, resulted in drops in fiscal 
revenue and increases in the fiscal deficit.  At that point, further fiscal 
spending cuts were implemented, and so on and so forth, feeding the 
economy’s downward spiral. 
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Third, the IMF tripled its exposure to Argentina (from $5 billion to $15 
billion) just three months before the default.51  This postponed the 
Convertibility system’s collapse, thus deepening the capital flight process 
that was already taking place and that eventually resulted in the December 
2001 run on deposits.  
However, the IMF’s participation in the Argentine crisis does not end 
with the December 2001 default.  According to official Argentine 
government documents, following the crisis, the IMF committed substantial 
errors in three key areas: (1) diagnosing the crisis and its aftermath, (2) 
making projections about the evolution of key economic variables in the 
post-crisis months, and (3) making policy prescriptions.52 
Among the projection errors committed by the IMF, the official 
document mentions two examples. 
IMF economists first ignored, and then refused to accept, 
empirical evidence presented to them in June 2002 that indicated 
that the drop in economic activity had bottomed out and that there 
were strong signs of economic reactivation.  Based on these 
indications, Argentine authorities projected an 11 percent drop in 
GDP for 2002.  However, as late as September 2002, IMF 
technical staff were projecting a GDP contraction of 16–20  
percent.  Actual GDP growth for 2002 was -10.9 percent.53 
Then, despite the IMF’s projections of a substantial drop in 
GDP, the IMF also projected a real exchange rate appreciation.  
This was to be caused by real and nominal exchange rate 
“overshooting,” which IMF staff believed would be substantial due 
to the chaotic exit from the fixed exchange rate regime.  Basically, 
IMF staff believed that relative prices would continue to be very 
close to what they had been during the fixed exchange rate regime.  
In contrast, Argentine officials believed that due to the prolonged 
recession and the abrupt interruption of capital flows, the 
equilibrium real exchange rate would be substantially depreciated 
compared to the convertibility real exchange rate.  Actual data 
proved that Argentine official projections were correct.54 
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According to the Argentine official document, the IMF also generally 
disregarded Argentine policy initiatives, insisting on its own policy 
prescriptions.55  Given the IMF’s errors in diagnosing the crisis and its 
effects, its policy prescription errors were also substantial. 
• In February 2002, after the fixed exchange rate was abandoned, 
the IMF insisted on a totally free floating exchange rate regime, 
which Argentine authorities implemented against their better 
judgment.  The IMF’s argument supporting its plan was that the 
foreign exchange market would automatically reach a new 
equilibrium.  However, just as the Argentine authorities feared 
would happen, the price of the dollar shot up because of a 
speculative bubble that appeared to have no ceiling.  The price 
of the dollar stabilized only when Argentine authorities 
implemented a “dirty float” in April 2002.  The IMF, however, 
rejected the dirty float exchange rate regime, arguing that the 
Central Bank’s international reserves did not belong to the 
country and could therefore not be freely utilized to prop up the 
currency.56 
• The IMF also opposed the Argentine government’s decision to 
make optional the swap of frozen bank deposits for bonds (the 
swap was required to normalize the banking system).  Instead, 
the IMF wanted to make the swap compulsory, illustrating a 
lack of comprehension of the volatile social and political 
situation in Argentina during 2002.  A compulsory swap would 
likely have caused more social upheavals at a time when 
stabilizing policies were badly needed. 
• For the financial system, the IMF recommended the same shock 
treatment that had had failed in Indonesia following the 1997 
Asian crisis.  The IMF advised drastically reducing the number 
of financial institutions, seeking an accelerated purge of the 
banking system by closing down banks not deemed viable.  The 
government, however, preferred a gradualist approach, since the 
number of banks had already dropped considerably since the 
1995 Tequila crisis.  The government also believed that, in time, 
those financial institutions that were not viable would close on 
their own.57 
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• As is the norm, the IMF continued to demand fiscal spending 
cuts following the December 2001 crisis.  However, the default 
on much of the public debt meant that Argentina would run a 
primary and overall surplus for the first time in many decades, 
making spending cuts unnecessary.58 
Further, the IMF went considerably beyond its mandate, making 
recommendations unrelated to the IMF’s purview or areas of expertise.  For 
example, in the months following the crisis, the IMF called for a change in 
Argentina’s bankruptcy law to remove protections for firms filing for 
bankruptcy and to provide better conditions for creditors.59  The IMF also 
actively lobbied for the repeal of the “economic subversion” law, under 
which the government could investigate white collar crimes committed by 
firms, banks, or individuals.60  At the time, the law was being used to 
investigate capital flight that had violated banking restrictions implemented 
during the crisis.  Both laws were modified according to the IMF’s 
demands.61  Finally, the IMF also insisted that privatized utilities be allowed 
to increase fees as they saw fit.62  Utility rates had been frozen in the post-
crisis months pending contract renegotiations with the privatized utilities, 
due to systematic and well-documented contract violations.  Despite the fact 
that many of these renegotiations are still pending, many utility rates have 
been steadily increasing for the last few years.63 
In sum, it is clear that the IMF was partially responsible for the Argentine 
crisis.  The IMF actively participated in the design of the macroeconomic 
policy environment that resulted in the December 2001 collapse.  As a 
result, Argentine authorities concluded that “the IMF’s technical staff 
appears not to be totally up to the task of dealing with a situation where a 
large crisis has erupted and should, therefore, give local authorities a greater 
margin to formulate and implement economic policies necessary to deal 
with the crisis.”64 
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III.   HOW COSTLY WAS SOVEREIGN DEFAULT? 
Some have argued that Argentina’s default was too costly, stating that the 
dramatic drop in GDP in 2002 was a direct consequence of that default.65  
However, Argentina’s sovereign debt default provides arguments for a 
powerful refutation of the conventional wisdom regarding the costs of 
default.  The consensus among orthodox economists and experts in 
international finance was that Argentina would suffer severe long-term 
consequences for breaking the rules in such a spectacular way: a huge 
sovereign default, combined with what was widely denounced in the 
business press as a refusal to bargain with creditors, and a contentious 
relationship with the IMF.66  The result, however, has been quite the 
opposite.   
Before considering the hypothetical costs of default, it is useful to lay out 
the sequence of events in order to better understand the issues.  First, by 
January 2002, Argentina was in an economic depression which had begun 
in the last quarter of 1998.  As a result of the depression and of IMF-
sponsored fiscal austerity measures, it had become increasingly difficult to 
balance fiscal accounts—a problem that was temporarily solved by taking 
on new debt.67  Consequently, it became clear that the convertibility regime 
had become unfeasible, as its continued existence hinged on increasingly 
unavailable foreign capital flows.  Second, the abrupt end of foreign credit 
to Argentina in late 2001 resulted in the much publicized default and sealed 
the fate of the convertibility regime.68  Third, the exit from the convertibility 
regime in early 2002 was unplanned and disorderly.69  The currency was 
initially fixed at a higher value vis-à-vis the dollar, eventually being 
allowed to float freely per IMF recommendations, causing substantial 
dislocation in the economy.70  When, contrary to IMF prescriptions, a 
managed float was adopted for the exchange rate in late April 2002, the 
economy began to emerge from the crisis.71 
Given the sequence of events, it should be clear that the deepening of the 
crisis in 2002 was due far more to the effects of the depression and chaotic 
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exit from the fixed exchange rate regime than to the default itself.  
However, even from the perspective of those that blame the default for the 
crisis, the default was still the least costly option available.  Further, even if 
one insisted on blaming the crisis on the default, a convincing argument can 
still be made that defaulting was the least costly option available.  Over the 
three-month period following the December 2001 default, the economy 
continued to decline, losing about 6.3 percent of its GDP.72  The loss in 
GDP is an upper bound for the cost of the default because it is almost 
certain that, even if the best of all possible non-default solutions had been 
brokered, there would still have been a further decline in GDP before the 
economy recovered.  In reality, the cost of Argentina’s default was almost 
certainly less than zero, since any non-default solution reached at that time 
would most likely have cost the country more, in terms of continued lost 
output, than did the default. 
Within a few months of the default, economic recovery was well under 
way, and there was positive growth for the last three quarters of 2002.73  
The Argentine economy grew by 8.8 percent in 2003 and by 9 percent in 
2004 and 2005.74  Thus, from the perspective of “shock therapy”—a harsh 
adjustment, necessary to get the economy back on a sustainable growth 
path—the post-default adjustment was successful and delivered quick 
results. Therefore, even if one insisted on blaming the economic crisis on 
the default, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that default was the right 
choice for Argentina.  
In fact, even taking the worst estimate of the cost of default (6.3 percent 
of GDP), it is still virtually equal to Mexico’s loss from the 1995 peso crisis 
(6.2 percent of GDP), where Mexico was assisted with a $40 billion IMF 
package.75  It is also substantially less than the cost of adjustment during the 
Asian economic crisis, where Indonesia lost more than 13 percent of GDP.76  
It is important to remember that the Argentine government received 
absolutely no outside assistance during the entire crisis.  Quite the opposite 
occured, in fact there was a very large net drain of money out of Argentina 
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to multilateral creditors.77  In 2002, as poverty and unemployment reached 
record levels, and as the recovery was just getting under way, the country 
made net payments totaling $4.1 billion, or more than 4 percent of the GDP, 
to multilateral creditors.78  For 2003–2004, there were further net payments 
of $5.9 billion.79  From a purely economic standpoint, the default seems a 
success.  More importantly, the economy was able to get back on a solid 
growth path, something that could have taken much longer if it had retained 
its crushing debt burden. 
It is hard to imagine that Argentina would have done better by trying to 
please the IMF and other creditors.  The previous four years of depression, 
as well as the demands put forward by the IMF in its protracted negotiations 
with Argentina during 2002, indicate that continued stagnation and even 
further decline were likely possibilities if the country had pursued tighter 
monetary and fiscal policies.  Also, the acceptance of an unsustainable debt 
burden would have undermined the confidence of foreign investors. The 
Argentine government made the best decision that it could under the 
circumstances, and it probably avoided further chaos by choosing default 
and rejecting IMF prescriptions. 
IV.   DEBT RESTRUCTURING AND BEYOND 
In early 2003, it became clear that Argentina was emerging from its 
political and economic crisis.  As a result, the IMF and defaulted creditors 
increased pressure on Argentina for a solution to its $100 billion default 
debt.  After intense negotiations, including two different Argentine official 
debt-restucturing proposals, a debt restructuring swap was opened and a 
substantial portion of the defaulted bonds were swapped.  Despite this 
relative success, many questions remain regarding Argentina’s public debt 
sustainability.  The following section discusses the debt-restructuring 
process and its implications. 
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A. Leaving the Default Behind: From Dubai to Buenos Aires 
The process to emerge from default began in September 2003, when 
Argentina issued a set of conditions to creditors under which it was willing 
to restructure its debt.80  Conditions included a 75 percent capital reduction, 
or “haircut,” considerably lower interest rates and longer maturities, and no 
recognition of interest payments accrued since the default.81  Creditors were 
outspokenly opposed to these restructuring conditions and demanded a 
better offer.82  One of the more outspoken groups, the Global Committee of 
Argentine Bond-holders (GCAB), even teamed up with the IMF to pressure 
Argentina for a better deal for private creditors.83 
IMF and creditor pressure resulted in a new offer on June 1, 2004.  
Known as the “Buenos Aires Proposal,” the new offer represented a 100 
percent improvement for defaulted creditors over the Dubai guidelines.  
Interest rates were doubled, the haircut was reduced from 75 percent to 
roughly 45 percent, and recognition of past-due interest since the default 
was recognized as a part of the debt.84  The Buenos Aires offer, however, 
was still not accepted by either the IMF or the creditors.  The Argentine 
government’s offer, nonetheless, was final because officials claimed that the 
resulting debt-service load was the maximum the country could afford to 
pay based on realistic sustainability assumptions.85  Thus, for the first time 
in the history of modern defaults, the debt restructuring swap proceeded 
without the explicit support of the IMF. 
 The debt-swap process ended on February 25, 2005, with a 76.15 percent 
acceptance rate.86  This was no small accomplishment and did indeed have 
several important aspects.  The deal implicitly recognized the impossibility 
of servicing the pre-default debt under the terms with which it was issued.  
Additionally, Argentina successfully resisted substantial pressure from the 
IMF and the financial establishment to improve the offer.  Further, the new 
bonds issued as a result of the debt restructuring were for a lower amount 
and at lower interest rates, thereby improving Argentina’s debt-service 
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terms over those existing prior to the default.  And finally, the default was 
resolved after three years of uncertainty. 
Specifically, the financial results of the debt restructuring swap can be 
summarized as follows: 
• Of the $81 billion in defaulted debt, $62.318 billion, or 76.15 
percent, entered the debt-swap.  Holders of roughly $19 billion 
did not accept the terms and conditions of the swap and remain 
as holdouts.87 
• For the $62.318 billion that entered the swap, the Argentine 
government issued $35.261 billion in new bonds.  That is, the 
“haircut,” or reduction on the nominal value of the defaulted 
bonds, was 43.4 percent.88 
• The maturity of the new bonds is considerably longer (up to 
forty-two years) than the old bonds and the interest rates are 
considerably lower. 89 
• The currency structure of the new debt also changed 
considerably. A full 37 percent of the total stock of post-swap 
debt is now denominated in pesos.  Morever, the rate of return 
on these bonds is tied to inflation, making them by far the most 
profitable investment in the Argentine public debt bond pool.90 
• The debt-to-GDP ratio went from 113 percent at the time of 
default in December 2001, to 72 percent after the default.  
However, this does not take into account the $19 billion that did 
not enter the debt-restructuring.  Therefore, total debt-to-GDP 
ratio is actually 87 percent when one takes holdout debt into 
account.91 
Accordingly, even though the capital reduction was considerably less 
than the 75 percent proclaimed by the government, one can still consider the 
debt restructuring to have been a success, particularly given the lack of 
support from the IMF and the G7.  Several factors made this result possible. 
On the international front, low interest rates and a lack of good investment 
options, the decreasing credibility of the IMF both within and outside the 
institution, and a generalized belief that the Argentine fixed exchange rate 
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regime had run its course, were all key.  Another important factor was the 
lack of alternatives for private creditors vis-à-vis the Argentine government 
debt restructuring offer.  An indication of this lack of alternatives was the 
relatively high acceptance rate of the Buenos Aires Proposal by creditors 
even in the face of a substantial capital reduction. 
B. Troubles with the Official Approach to Debt Restructuring 
The government presented the results of the debt restructuring swap as a 
resounding success.  The IMF, as well as the creditors owning 24 percent of 
the defaulted debt who did not participate in the debt restructuring swap—
referred to as “holdouts”—claim that the default is not yet fully resolved.  
While this is problematic, there are other fundamental problems that 
Argentina’s post-debt-swap situation leaves unsolved. 
1. Acceptance of All Pre-Default Debt as Valid 
Perhaps one of the most troubling aspects of the Argentine government’s 
approach to debt restructuring is that it unquestioningly accepted all pre-
default debt as valid.  By doing so, the official strategy ignored the 
substantial irregularities committed by the military dictatorship (1976-1983) 
when contracting the debt.92  The official strategy also validated all of the 
financial speculation cycles and scams of the past two-and-a-half decades.  
These cycles typically consisted of a period of growing private and public 
indebtedness, followed by capital flight and eventually the “socialization” 
of private debt (i.e., the transformation of private debt into public debt) as 
the financial crisis erupted.93  These cycles were compounded by repeated 
debt restructuring episodes, which turned out to be major scams in which 
the financial and corporate sectors benefited greatly from overpriced bonds, 
and the public sector (i.e., the taxpayers) was repeatedly and cumulatively 
saddled with the costs of financial speculation.  
778 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
CASE STUDIES ON NEOLIBERAL ECONOMIC REFORMS 
Critics have rightfully argued that the government should have used the 
debt restructuring opportunity provided by the default to carry out a long-
overdue, in-depth examination and depuration of the stock of public debt.  
2. IFI Debt Unquestioned 
Equally troubling is the Argentine government’s treatment of 
international financial institution (IFI) debt.  The official approach has been 
to fully honor the approximately $32 billion debt to the IFIs without even 
trying to get more favorable repayment conditions (for example, lower 
interest rates and/or a longer repayment timeline).  Official justification for 
this approach was that G7 support was needed for the debt-swap to be 
successful.  In this view, to challenge the validity of IFI debt would have 
been too costly and could have threatened the success of the debt-
restructuring effort. 
As time has shown, Argentina’s strategy regarding IFI debt failed, since 
the IMF and the G7 never did back the Argentine debt-restructuring 
process.  As a result, the strategy on IFI debt imparted (1) a larger capital 
reduction on private creditors; (2) preferential treatment to those who bear 
substantial responsibility for the Argentine catastrophe; and (3) larger fiscal 
surpluses (or new indebtedness) in order to face a hefty IFI debt-service 
load during the next decade. 
3. Paying Off the IMF: Poster Child Till the Bitter End 
If the Argentine official strategy vis-à-vis IFI debt was questionable, the 
strategy on IMF debt was downright scandalous.  Official debt-service 
sustainability projections had been based on an agreement with the IMF that 
would have provided for the rollover of 100 percent of IFI capital payments 
for the foreseeable future.94  However, in order to refinance this debt, an 
agreement with the IMF was necessary.  This would have required 
implementing the usual list of IMF-sponsored policies, many of which were 
directly responsible for the 2001 economic crisis. 
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Clearly, the government could not submit to such conditionality and risk 
turning the economic recovery into yet another recession.  It is also clear 
that Argentina had substantial leverage that it could bring to bear in its 
negotiations with the Fund.  With a debt of roughly $10 billion,95 Argentina 
was the IMF’s third largest debtor behind Brazil and Turkey.  As the old 
adage goes, “if you owe the bank $10,000, you have a problem; if you owe 
the bank $10 billion, the bank has a problem.” 
Given this situation, the Argentine government had several options 
available.  First, it could have continued to service the debt with the IMF 
according to the original payment schedule, as Argentina had been doing 
since the last agreement failed in August 2004.  Alternatively, it could have 
unilaterally restructured its debt with the IMF, making its maturity equal to 
that of restructured bonds (thirty-five years on average).  A third option 
would have been to unilaterally restructure its debt with the IMF, imposing 
similar conditions to those imposed on private creditors (capital reduction, 
reduction of interest rates, and substantially longer maturity).  Finally, 
Argentina could have defaulted to the IMF as a way to recover some of the 
losses caused by IMF blunders. 
However, rather than taking any of the above options, President 
Kirchner’s administration opted for a solution suggested by the IMF itself: 
to pay the IMF in full, three years ahead of schedule, using Central Bank 
international reserves.96  Thus, in early January 2006, the Kirchner 
administration took $10 billion from the Central Bank’s international 
reserves and paid off the IMF, proving that Argentina was willing to be the 
IMF’s poster child until the bitter end.97  The government presented the 
IMF debt cancellation as part of their desendeudamiento, or debt-reduction 
strategy.  In reality, Argentina’s net stock of public debt did not change, 
since the Argentine Treasury had to issue new bonds in order to compensate 
the Central Bank for the reserves it was taking to pay off the IMF.98 
According to the government’s rhetoric, with this payment Argentina was 
able to finally liberate itself from the IMF.99  While it is true that Argentina 
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needed to rid itself of the IMF, and it is also true that the IMF is no longer 
in the picture, this was the worst possible to way to get rid of the IMF.  
Given the IMF’s shared responsibility for Argentina’s economic crisis, and 
given Argentina’s ongoing high hunger, poverty, and unemployment rates, 
it is questionable whether this was the best use of $10 billion.100 
4. Post-Default Debt Fully Recognized 
Also questionable was the official approach to the roughly $35 billion 
public debt issued in the months following the default and devaluation.  The 
financial system entered a new crisis as a result of the 2002 devaluation and 
because many bank customers had dollar-denominated loans.  In order to 
avoid massive bankruptcies, the government converted all loans to pesos at 
the old exchange rate of one peso to one dollar, and issued bonds to the 
banks for the difference between the old and the then-current nominal 
exchange rates.101  In the process, the government bailed out countless large 
corporations, many of which produced mostly for export markets and made 
dollars in exchange—corporations that were in no risk of bankruptcy due to 
the devaluation.102 
However, most of this new debt is owned by the local financial system, 
which explains why the official strategy was to accept all debt as legitimate 
and to continue making payments on this debt as originally contracted.103  
Critics have maintained that beneficiaries of this new debt issue should have 
been identified and a tax levied against those who benefited unduly.  This 
was not done and, as a result, the Argentine taxpayer and defaulted creditors 
must pay for this unnecessary corporate bailout. 
C. A Heavy Burden   
Many issues factor into the question of how much of a solution to 
Argentina’s decade-long debt problem this latest debt-swap represents.  
Clearly, much depends on the debt-service structure for the years ahead, and 
on other factors such as macroeconomic performance and economic growth, 
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fiscal revenue, the exchange and inflation rates, the balance of payments, 
and foreign interest rates.  
Table 5 contains a schedule of Argentina’s debt-service obligations for 
the period 2006–2016.  Before interpreting the data, it is necessary to make 
some important clarifications about payments that are excluded from the 
table: 
 
• The data assumes the January 2006 $10 billion payoff to the IMF as having 
taken place and, therefore, does not include any debt-service payments to 
the IMF;  
• The data does not include debt-service payments on the $10 billion in bonds 
issued by the Treasury to the Central Bank in compensation for the 
international reserves used to pay off the IMF; 
• The data does not include $5.3 billion that the Treasury owes the Central 
Bank and is supposed to pay back in 2005;104 
• The data does not include payments for the “GDP-linked” coupons on 
restructured bonds;105  
• The data does not include debt-service payments for new debt issued in 
2006 or later;106 
• The data does not include payments on the roughly $24 billion holdout 
debt; 
• The data does not include $2.5 billion debt to the Paris Club and other 
official creditors, which is still in default and pending restructuring; and 
• The “Total” column includes payments due after 2016 but not shown in the 
table. 
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When added up, the data not included in Table 5 amounts to substantial 
payments, making the debt-service schedule all the more onerous.  Bearing 
that in mind, several conclusions can be drawn based on the data in Table 5.  
First, Argentina’s debt-service obligations through 2011 exceed 3 percent 
of the GDP.  Furthermore, through 2009, Argentina’s yearly debt-service 
obligations exceed 4 percent of the GDP.  Even with IMF debt service out 
of the picture, the government will have to issue new debt in order to meet 
its debt-service payments.  New debt issues and growth rates above 3 
percent will result in heftier debt-service payments in the short- and 
medium-run, which means that the debt-service load will be considerably 
heavier than what Table 5 shows. 
Second, Argentina’s debt-service schedule, augmented by new debt 
issues, implies that the government will need to have large, sustained 
primary fiscal surpluses for many years to come.  Indeed, a recent 
publication by economists from the University of Buenos Aires concludes 
that Argentina will have to maintain a primary surplus of 3 percent of GDP 
and positive growth rates for the next twenty-five years in order to meet 
debt-service payments.107  Obtaining such results would require a break 
from Argentina’s two hundred-year history, since the country was never 
able to achieve such macroeconomic performance on a sustained basis. 
Furthermore, obtaining a primary surplus of this magnitude on a 
sustained basis depends on several factors.  A primary surplus depends on 
high rates of growth because Argentina’s tax structure is highly dependent 
on economic activity.  Therefore, in order for fiscal revenue to keep up with 
debt service, high rates of growth are necessary.  However, high growth 
rates also impact debt service since many of the restructured bonds have 
“GDP-linked” coupons.  A primary surplus also depends on tight control of 
fiscal spending.  In order to obtain and sustain a surplus, fiscal spending 
must be kept in check.  This means continuing to postpone public sector 
wage increases and other urgent needs, such as dealing with still alarmingly 
high rates of poverty, indigence, unemployment, and dealing with the 
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profound crises in the education and public healthcare systems.  A third 
factor in obtaining a primary surplus is export growth because one-third of 
fiscal revenues come from export taxes.  In other words, maintaining a 
primary surplus means that exports will need to continue to grow apace. 
Furthermore, since two-thirds of Argentina’s public debt is denominated in 
foreign currency, maintaining a trade surplus is also key to getting the 
foreign exchange needed to meet debt-service payments.   
Third, maintaining a trade surplus depends on being able to maintain 
price competitiveness, and price competitiveness depends on being able to 
maintain a competitive exchange rate and low salaries, in relative terms.  In 
other words, this means being able to continue to postpone long-delayed 
real wage improvements for Argentine workers who have seen their income 
consistently eroded in real terms for the last three decades of WC-sponsored 
policies. 
Fourth, inflation control is another key component of the government’s 
policy agenda.  Inflation has two major potential impacts with regards to 
debt service.  First, inflation affects consumer and investor expectations and 
can eventually negatively impact economic growth.  Second, 37 percent of 
Argentina’s restructured public debt is denominated in domestic currency 
and is linked to inflation.  An increase in inflation directly impacts the 
country’s debt-service commitments.  Additionally, in order to keep 
inflation in check, the government’s main objective is to maintain the set of 
relative prices that resulted from the maxi-devaluation that took place in 
early 2002.  This means keeping wages repressed—a difficult task in the 
face of increased demands for redistributive policies to make up for many 
years of real-wage decline. 
Fifth, debt sustainability also assumes that Argentina will be able to issue 
new debt, at reasonable interest rates and maturities, in order to finance 
current debt service.  With local banks already heavily exposed to the public 
sector—roughly 50 percent of bank portfolios are in state securities—new 
funding may be hard to come by.  Relying on foreign capital could 
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complicate matters further, as capital inflows are generally motivated by 
short-term speculative behavior, and can have destabilizing effects on the 
nominal exchange rate—the centerpiece of the government’s 
macroeconomic policy.  
The overriding conclusions are simply that, in the “best case” scenario, 
for the next thirty years, debt service will continue to be a dominating factor 
of Argentina’s economic, social, and political life.  Additionally, there is no 
chance that the regressive effects of three decades of WC-sponsored 
policies will be undone in the short- or medium-run.  Specifically, this 
means postponing redistributive policies, not dealing with highly 
concentrated and unequal power structures within the economy, and not 
dealing with still alarmingly high levels of poverty, indigence, and 
unemployment. 
In sum, it is hard to conclude that Argentina has finally left its stop-and-
go financial cycles of debt accumulation, crises, and restructuring behind.  
Argentina’s debt-service schedule, especially in the short- to medium-term, 
is hefty;  being able to keep up with it depends on maintaining the highly 
unequal economic structure of the past decades.  
 IV.   CONCLUSION: WHAT CAN WE LEARN? 
Argentina’s experience with debt and financial crises over the last 
decades provides important lessons. 
1.    Default can be a viable option: Clearly default is not something to 
be taken lightly, but it has been and will likely continue to be an 
option for sovereign borrowers.  The Argentine case shows that 
defaulting was not as disastrous as many had predicted.  Indeed, 
the default helped Argentina to end the unviable fixed exchange 
rate regime and it freed up resources to deal with the multiple 
dislocations produced by the structural changes that resulted from 
the devaluation.  Whether the time and resources were put to best 
use in Argentina is a different matter, but it is unquestionable that 
the default was the correct and most efficient option, given the 
circumstances.   
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2.    Public debt should be subject to strict scrutiny and rules: This is 
fundamental to avoiding excessive indebtedness and financial 
cycles and crises, which are costly and undesirable.  It is also 
fundamental that the process by which a country takes on new debt 
be scrutinized by the country’s representative institutions, such as 
its congress or parliament, and that new debt be subject to 
extensive sustainability analysis. 
3.     It is easier to default on foreign lenders than domestic lenders: It is 
clear from the government bailouts—of privatized pension funds, 
banks, and the corporate sector—that it is easier to default on 
foreign bondholders than on domestic bondholders and powerful 
economic actors.  The reason for this should be clear.  The main 
consequence of a default on foreign borrowers is political and 
perhaps financial.  Defaulting on domestic borrowers would almost 
certainly have substantial political repercussions, in addition to 
severe economic and financial consequences.  
4.     Pleasing financial markets should not be the aim of debt-
restructuring processes: For a debt-restructuring process to result in 
a sustainable and serviceable debt load, it must be based on an 
economy that grows thanks to strong internal markets.  For this to 
take place, it is fundamental to have productive investment and an 
equitable distribution of income.  This is opposite to the 
Washington Consensus prescriptions, which are centered on 
financial liberalization and the free flow of speculative funds.108  
Those are precisely the policies that feed the financial stop-and-go 
cycles that Argentina has experienced for the last three decades, 
the results of which are well known: unsustainable debt loads, 
financial crises, defaults, and record levels of poverty and 
unemployment.  
5.    A return to international capital markets is not a sign of success: 
Neither should a return to international capital markets be taken as 
a sign of financial health.  If debt sustainability is contingent on 
renewed access to international capital markets, then most likely, 
debt-dependence will not have been fully severed. 
6.    Ending financial stop-and-go cycles and debt-led capital 
accumulation should become a priority: Argentina is a prime 
example of the failure of financial liberalization and “debt-led” 
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development policies.109  Since dependence on foreign capital 
flows and indebtedness do not lead to sustainable development, it 
is of prime importance to abandon these policies in favor of 
economic policies that promote sustainable and egalitarian growth.  
It is essential to reclaim the language, ideas, theory, and policies of 
development economics, which neoliberal economics has 
discarded.  A strong state, capable of efficiently and effecitvely 
intervening in and regulating economic activity, is essential.  
7.    Debt restructuring should be approached globally, and not 
exclusively as a financial issue: By approaching the debt issue 
exclusively in financial terms, Argentina ended up with a debt-
service schedule that substantially reduced its freedom to undo the 
nefarious legacy of decades of WC-type policies.  Furthermore, 
Argentina also wasted an opportunity to examine its debt-
accumulation process and to make sure those who benefited 
unduly were taxed accordingly.  These issues should have been 
addressed in order to ensure a fairer distribution of the burden of 
debt service.  
8.    The success of a debt-restructuring process cannot depend on 
prolonged, large primary fiscal and trade surpluses: In the 
Argentine case, the success of the debt-restructuring process 
depends on large and sustained primary fiscal and trade surpluses.  
This strategy is questionable and its chances of success are 
dubious.  First, a large primary surplus drains resources from the 
economy that could be used to foster investment and job creation, 
and to contribute to a more equitable distribution of income.  
Second, economic cycles are endemic to market economies, and 
Argentina is certainly no exception.  To assume that an economy 
will indefinitely have positive growth, in addition to primary and 
trade surpluses, is unrealistic.  Unfortunately, this is precisely the 
assumption made in the government’s sustainability analysis.  
9.    The IMF is incapable of predicting financial crises and lacks the 
tools or knowledge to deal with a crisis once it erupts: If there is a 
lesson that stands out from the Argentine experience, it is that the 
IMF does not possess the know-how or the appropriate theoretical 
framework to forecast or effectively deal with financial crises.  The 
IMF’s “one size fits all” approach to economic policy and crisis 
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resolution has failed repeatedly around the world.  Asian nations 
have learned this lesson well and their massive foreign reserve 
accumulations now serve as an insurance against ever having to 
follow IMF advice again.  While reserve accumulation can be 
costly, it is bound to be less costly than following the IMF’s 
advice. 
10.  Once the crisis erupted, the IMF was more eager to cash-in and 
get out than to provide assistance: After the crisis erupted in 
December 2001, the IMF did not provide Argentina with any new 
funds.110  Furthermore, the IMF’s efforts appeared to be geared 
primarily toward reducing its exposure in Argentina.111  
Unfortunately, Argentina did exactly as the IMF expected, using 
its Central Bank reserves to cancel its IMF debt in advance. 
11. The international financial institutions must be redesigned: The 
IMF’s substantial mishandling of the Argentine (and other) 
financial crises clearly points to a need for institutional redesign.  
The IMF and The World Bank’s grossly mistaken policy 
prescriptions point in the same direction.  It is clearly necessary to 
redesign the IFIs in such a way as to create a true international 
lender of last resort that will provide financial assistance to 
countries experiencing a crisis.  Additionally, IFIs should be 
accountable for the policies they prescribe and the results they 
produce. 
History will tell if the lessons from the Argentine debt debacle will help 
to modify the current process of international economic integration, in 
particular the development policies of peripheral countries.  If debt default 
is used simply as a shortcut to return to the liberalized international capital 
markets, then clearly not much will have been learned.  Rather, the task 
ahead should be to define a development strategy that leaves behind the 
model of spasmodic debt-accumulation cycles. 
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